SCU paper (Hancock, Porritt, Grosvenor 2023) applied US intelligence community threat/warnings methodology to 590 UAP reports + 284 additional reports near atomic facilities 1945-1975. Five facility types analyzed: materials production, weapons assembly, stockpiles, deployment platforms, missile testing. Intention ranking: (1) MOST LIKELY — Focused atomic weapons survey. (2) POSSIBLE — General military survey. (3) LESS LIKELY — Atomic warfare prevention. (4) LEAST LIKELY — Military aggression. Critical case — Killeen Base/Fort Hood nuclear stockpile 1949: UAP incursions so frequent that the US Army established INSTRUMENTED OBSERVATION POSTS with calculated size, distance, and speed measurements. Army, Navy Intelligence, and FBI held weekly joint meetings. Army concluded “agencies were unanimous in agreeing that the unknown phenomena could not be attributed to natural causes.” Despite ongoing incursions at American atomic facilities across the entire study period, nuclear weapons development was never interrupted — suggesting surveillance rather than interdiction as primary intent.