Jan 03, 2025
Written By [Christopher Sharp](https://www.liberationtimes.com/?author=610434e320e3e945538177b1)
Liberation Times Opinion & Insight
Written by Geoff Cruickshank – 3 January 2025
Recent confirmations reveal U.S. government knowledge of Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) tagging along with re-entry vehicles during missile tests.
Notable examples include the Atlas 8F missile test on 19 September 1962 and the apparent shootdown [of a UAP during the Bluegill Triple Prime nuclear test on 26 October 1962](https://www.liberationtimes.com/home/the-hidden-truth-behind-a-1960s-nuclear-test-a-non-human-craft-fell-down-to-earth).
These developments add credibility to Lieutenant Bob Jacobs’ account of the ‘Big Sur’ incident on 15 September 1964.
During this event, Lieutenant Jacobs filmed a UAP interfering with the deployed Re-entry Vehicle (RV) of an ICBM test.
This was part of the Advanced Ballistic Re-Entry System (ABRES) program, using a specialized image orthicon telescope loaned from Boston University.
Following the incident, Lieutenant Jacobs was shown the footage during his debriefing and instructed by his superior officer to “never speak of it again.”
The footage is reportedly stored in the U.S. National Archives at a classified level.
Newly uncovered technical reports suggest deliberate misinformation about the missile guidance systems involved, likely to cover up the true events. Sixty years later, the footage remains classified.
If there’s nothing to hide, why is it still kept secret?
This article dives into technical data from the guidance systems used at Vandenberg Air Force Base (the Western Test Range) in 1964. It aims to show two key points:
1. The systems blamed for the ‘All Engine Cut Out’ command and strange trajectory issues couldn’t have caused those problems, as the official report claims.
2. The deactivated system was likely used as a convenient excuse to cover up what really happened—avoiding costly investigations and changes to the Atlas ICBM fleet and NASA’s Agena program. According to Lieutenant Jacobs and Major Mansmann, the real issue was interference from a “tag-along” UAP during RV separation.
To back this up, the article goes through the data from the one-page report, line by line, breaking down what it really means.
The report in question is found on [page 37 of the Vandenberg Commander’s summary of Atlas missile launches from 1963-1964](https://planet4589.org/space/docs/vafb/VCR_Atlas63-64.pdf).
Let’s go through this, line by line.
Line 1: Classification Details
The report was originally classified as SECRET on 7 October 1964. It was later downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL on 6 November 1967 and fully declassified around 1976, following Department of Defense Directive 5200.10 (as indicated by the stamp and dates on the footer).
Line 2: Missile and Mission Details
The missile used was an Atlas D, part of the 107A weapons system, and the mission was codenamed “BUTTERFLY NET.” This test aimed to evaluate the Kwajalein Anti-Ballistic Missile radar’s ability to track a Low Observable Re-entry Vehicle (LORV) and a miniature graphite model of a re-entry vehicle.
Line 3: Launch Number and Serial Number
This was Atlas D missile number 245, with the serial number 62-12432.
Line 4: Launch Timing and Conditions
The test occurred on 15 September 1964 at 15:27 GMT (8:27 AM local time at Vandenberg Air Force Base). This aligns with Lieutenant Jacobs’ memory of a broad daylight launch. Sunrise that day was at 6:53 AM, meaning the launch took place under full daylight conditions. Another launch, codenamed “BUZZING BEE,” occurred later that month on 22 September at 6:08 AM local time, just before sunrise at 6:59 AM.
Lines 5-14: Countdown and Mission Purpose
The ‘BUTTERFLY NET’ mission was designed to test the flight characteristics of the LORV-3 prototype as it re-entered the Earth’s atmosphere. The test also included:
– A Graphite Test Vehicle strapped externally.
– A Scientific Passenger Pod with onboard experiments.
The LORV’s hypersonic maneuvering ability in its terminal phase was also tested. A prior launch attempt on 12 September failed due to issues with the LORV’s attitude control system. Lieutenant Jacobs’ recollection aligns with these details, confirming the test’s focus on the RV and not on a Nike Zeus radar, which was tested a week later.
The 15 September launch was delayed to replace a faulty liquid oxygen (LOX) solenoid and fix a sticking gantry platform.
Lines 15-27: The Discrepancy in Reports
This section raises questions about discrepancies in official accounts. Reporter Eric Mishara wrote in _Omni Magazine_ (1985) that Vandenberg’s media relations stated no UAP was involved and the missile hit its target. The spokesperson, Sergeant Lorri Wray, provided these assurances.
However, technical data contradicts this narrative, pointing to potential misinformation. The General Electric Radio Tracking System (GERTS), mentioned here, was one of two systems used for Atlas D missiles. Later models used Automatic Inertial Guidance (AIG), but earlier versions like the Atlas D relied on Radio Inertial Guidance (RIG).
Even with AIG, the Range Safety Officer could issue ALL ENGINE CUT OUT (AECO) or destruct commands if necessary.
The report’s explanation of the AECO event appears inconsistent with the known capabilities of the missile’s guidance systems, hinting at a possible deliberate cover-up.
Starting at Line 16, the 245D report states that:
‘Telemetry data indicated that the GERTS missileborne rate beacon failed at 63.8 seconds after lift-off.
Flight effects were that error box was automatically elongated, and Navy Safety GERTS sent an automatic ALL ENGINES CUT OFF (AECO) after SUSTAINER ENGINE CUT OFF (SECO). VERNIER ENGINES CUTOFF (VECO) was never sent because of AECO.’
The issue is that multiple official documents confirm the GERTS missile-borne rate beacon was installed but deactivated on all Atlas D series missiles.
This means the AECO signal could not have been sent by the Western Missile Range GERTS at Vandenberg Air Force Base —or even by a so-called ‘Navy Safety GERTS’ supposedly located downrange.
So, why does the [official flight test report](https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA205116.pdf) claim otherwise?
In the early days of the Atlas D missile system, long before the arrival of Automatic Inertial Guidance (AIG) , engineers ran into a frustrating issue: the missile’s rate beacons were easily overwhelmed by noisy AM signals from its own onboard systems.
They tried to fix it with a smoothing filter (ECR A3-41), but the problems didn’t go away.
Velocity calculations from the P station and Q station were still inconsistent, and the system struggled to perform as expected.
This was more than just a technical glitch—it was a big deal.
The fledgling AIG system needed pinpoint accuracy to issue critical commands like Booster Engine Cut Out (BECO), Sustainer Engine Cut Out (SECO), and Vernier Engine Cut Out (VECO).
These commands ensured the Re-entry Vehicle (RV) would follow the precise trajectory needed for a successful mission.
When the data didn’t add up, engineers had to rely on the backup Radio Inertial Guidance (RIG) system.
To make matters even more pressing, th
*[Read full article at Liberation Times]*